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The declared purpose of this book is two-fold: to update Curt F. Beck’s article which appeared in World Politics in 1963 pointing to Czechoslovakia’s extensive engagement in newly independent African states​[1]​; and to challenge one of its prime conclusions—that Prague was fulfilling a task assigned by Moscow.
	Using newly released archival material in the Czech Republic, American government documents as well as a wide range of secondary literature, this book continues the work of scholars on the autonomy and dynamism of Eastern European governments and the range of their activities in newly independent African states in the cold war era. Scholars have published detailed accounts based on former Soviet and East European archives on the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, and Bulgaria as well as the range of Yugoslav ideological and material involvement.​[2]​ Muehlenbeck’s book, written in a straightforward and accessible style, is a welcome addition to this literature. The author throws further light on the complexities of the relationship of these East European states with the Soviet Union, the relative importance—versus pragmatic assessment of practical national advantage—of socialist ideology, and the relative independence of their foreign policies. Furthermore, Czechoslovakia in Africa underlines the complex interaction of accelerating African decolonization with the shifting dynamics of the Cold War in the first two decades following World War II.
	Muehlenbeck’s central thesis is that from the establishment of a communist government following the Prague coup of February 1948 until the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and subsequent ousting of Alexander Dubcek, Czechoslovakia had significantly more autonomy from Moscow than has previously been assumed, and was not shy about exercising this. In this twenty-year period the Prague government certainly was neither a Soviet stooge nor ‘firm parrot’, as successive US Administrations believed. Muehlenbeck is careful to point out that Czechoslovakia’s foreign policy was by no means as independent as Castro’s Cuba’s in Africa (particularly between 1975 and 1990), and the Czechoslovak Government was scrupulous in consulting Moscow before making any major foreign policy decisions or launching new initiatives. (The author cites only one instance when Prague sought Moscow’s sanction after a policy initiative.) He charts the post-war reasoning behind the decision to exploit and expand its pre-war links with the African continent. There are thus identifiable continuities of ‘the Czechoslovak national interest’ between successive pre-war capitalist, post-war social democratic and then communist governments. In his detailed exploration of the post-1948 period under communism, Muehlenbeck identifies four firm reasons: economic, to boost its export economy and earn much needed hard currency; ideological, to boost its standing vis-à-vis Moscow through its highly conscious demonstration of international solidarity and expanding communist influence; concerns over power and prestige, seen as a key adjunct to building the state’s domestic and international legitimacy; and not least, pursuit of a moral cause to promote social justice and development. Muehlenbeck asserts that as a smaller Eastern bloc country, Prague was not regarded in the same light as her superpower ally and exploited the economic and cultural space this differentiation provided. In turn, entirely confident in Czech loyalty to the Soviet bloc in this period, the Soviet Government appreciated their ally’s contacts and experience, and “entrusted its junior ally with the task of spearheading the communist cause on the African continent.” But in areas of prime Soviet interest—Ghana and the Congo crisis—Moscow firmly led and Prague followed. 
Muehlenbeck frames his examination of Czechoslovak policy and varying engagement towards African states through separate sections on Czechoslovakia’s pro-Soviet orientation, structure of policy decision making and institutional involvement with African policy; relations with ‘Conservative African States’ (bizarrely, Egypt is included here, by claimed need of respecting the chronology and Prague’s perception of the conservative complexion of Nasser’s regime); relations with ‘Radical African States’; arms exports to Africa; aviation assistance to Africa; and finally, the decline of Czechoslovak influence in Africa in the 1960s. This enables the author to compare and contrast superpower relative engagement and perceptions of African decolonization and the emerging cold war contestation between them, as well as Czechoslovakia’s own policy and activity. While this has the benefit of placing Czechoslovakia’s involvement in context, at significant points the analysis shifts too far away from the declared purpose of the book into a general assessment of superpower contestation. This is particularly true of the material on the Congo crisis. Also, the separation of analysis into assessment of relations with a conservative/radical taxonomy of African states, followed by a contrived ‘functional’ division of realms of economic activity of arms sales and civil aviation, means that there is a considerable amount of overlap and repetition. There is much here which is new––particularly on the place of diplomatic representation (and thus local contact); the relative engagement with key African states of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali; the CSSR’s tardiness in responding to repeated calls by the South African Communist Party to close its consulate or cut all trade ties with apartheid South Africa; the place of education and culture; and chequered record on civil aviation, although this dimension had a poorly recognized geo-strategic importance in the Congo and Cuban missile crises. There is also important detail which refines and enhances our understanding—especially the scale, variety and purposes of the extraordinary level of arms sales, particularly a detailed reassessment of the notorious Czech arms deal to Egypt in 1955. There are points of irritation: the author fails to recognize that before the Second World War, the African continent was almost exclusively controlled, either directly or indirectly, by the European colonial powers; the author does not use consistent currency statistics—citing sales in Czech currency alone leaves the reader lost as to the relative value of these transactions—as well as other laboured statistical comparisons, such as “one African student for every 7,500 Czechoslovak citizens...and one African student per every 415,000 Soviets” (p. 168). Occasionally, there are extraordinary claims—such as the Cuban missile crisis proved “one of the pivotal chapters” of the Soviet bloc’s disengagement from Africa. While it might be true of the 1960s, it is a nonsense to apply this to the 1970s. That said, the author has made a praiseworthy contribution to our understanding of the relative place of ideology, national policy and pragmatism, as well as opportunism exercised by Czechoslovakia, and thus has underlined the importance of appreciating the complex interaction between African states’ decolonization agenda and the many dimensions of the Cold War.
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